The Supreme Court has dismissed an application by former Information Minister, Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, seeking a review of a decision by a single Justice of the court dismissing his application for an interlocutory injunction.
The five-member panel, presided over by Justice Emmanuel Yonny Kulendi, with Justices Richard Adjei-Frimpong and Gbiel Simon Suurbaareh among the members, unanimously held that the application had failed to meet the threshold for the exercise of the court’s review jurisdiction.
The court said the application was “unmeritorious” and dismissed it.
It said the full reasons for the decision would be available at the registry of the court on September 7, 2026.
Frank Davies represented Mr Oppong Nkrumah, while the Deputy Attorney-General (DAG), Dr Justice Srem-Sai, represented the Attorney-General.
Application for review
Mr Davies had urged the court to reverse the ruling of a single Justice, Justice Gabriel Scott Pwamang, who had dismissed an application for an interlocutory injunction dated August 21, 2026.
At the beginning of the proceedings, Mr Davies sought an adjournment to enable him to file a supplementary affidavit and a supplementary affidavit in reply, saying he had been served with the affidavit in opposition and statement of case by the Attorney-General only at about 5 p.m. the previous day.
He said he had only been able to confer with his client after 8 p.m.
Justice Adjei-Frimpong, however, questioned the need for the additional processes, saying he thought the matters raised were non-factual.
Mr Davies said there were issues of law raised in the affidavit in reply which, in his view, required a response because they went “to the very heart” of the application.
Justice Kulendi subsequently declined the request for an adjournment.
He noted that Mr Oppong Nkrumah’s statement of case ran into 32 pages, while his supporting affidavit contained 40 paragraphs.
He said the Attorney-General had responded with a 15-paragraph affidavit and a 13-page statement of case.
Justice Kulendi said the court was capable of determining the legal issues without further arguments from the parties.
“The law is in our bosom and we don’t need your help as far as the law is concerned,” he said.
The court subsequently dismissed the prayer for an adjournment and directed Mr Davies to move the application.
Grounds for review
Moving the application, Mr Davies said it sought an order reversing the ruling of Justice Pwamang dismissing the application for an interlocutory injunction.
He said the applicant would rely extensively on the 32-page statement of case and would only draw the court’s attention to what he described as “patent and salient errors” apparent on the face of the ruling.
Mr Davies argued that the single Justice had erred in his treatment of legal vacation and criminal proceedings.
He said the ruling suggested that the rules on legal vacation applied to civil trials and not criminal trials, adding that if criminal trials could proceed during legal vacation without a warrant, there was a need to explain why the impugned warrant was required.
He also argued that the single Justice should have exercised restraint by not delving into the merits of the substantive case, which would be determined by the full Bench.
According to Mr Davies, the single Justice had also applied a different test in determining whether the interlocutory injunction should be granted, by referring to the prospects of success of the substantive case rather than whether there was a serious question of law to be tried.
Mr Davies further raised an objection to the Attorney-General’s representation of the Chief Justice.
He argued that the Chief Justice performed an administrative function within the Judiciary, while the Attorney-General operated within the Executive arm of government.
He said the substantive action before the court challenged the administrative function of the Chief Justice and, therefore, the Attorney-General should not represent him in the matter.
AG opposes review
Opposing the application, Dr Srem-Sai said the review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court had a threshold which the applicant had failed to meet.
He said the applicant was required to establish special or exceptional circumstances to warrant the exercise of the court’s review jurisdiction.
“The review jurisdiction is not a stage for re-arguing matters which have already been argued before a single Justice. Neither is the review jurisdiction a stage for an appeal,” he said.
The DAG said the eight grounds relied upon by the applicant did not disclose any special circumstances.
On the issue of the Attorney-General’s representation of the Chief Justice, Dr Srem-Sai said the argument had no bearing on whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted.
He said the applicant’s argument that the absence of the Chief Justice meant that the averments in the applicant’s depositions had been admitted did not constitute grounds for reviewing the single Justice’s decision.
Dr Srem-Sai also disagreed with the contention that the single Justice had exceeded his jurisdiction by making pronouncements on matters in the substantive case.
He said the restriction against making pronouncements on the merits of a substantive matter applied where the same judge was to hear the substantive case.
In the present case, he said, the judge who dealt with the injunction application was different from the panel that would hear the substantive matter.
The DAG further argued that the applicant had not demonstrated any irreparable injury or exceptional circumstances to warrant the reversal of the single Justice’s decision.
He said the application was based on the same facts and issues contained in the original application, “reorganised”.
He therefore urged the court to dismiss the application and leave the single Justice’s decision undisturbed.
Application dismissed
In its ruling, the court said it had carefully considered the processes on record, including the affidavits and legal arguments contained in the respective statements of case.
It also said it had considered the oral submissions of counsel and paid attention to previous decisions of the court on the threshold that an application of that nature was required to meet.
The court concluded that the application had failed to meet the threshold on all the grounds raised.
“Our unanimous decision is that the application failed at the threshold on all grounds and as such ought to be dismissed as unmeritorious and is accordingly dismissed,” the court held.